Preparation for a New Wave of Mobilization in Russia: Briefing by the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine and the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine

Russia is drawing up plans for an additional wave of mobilization in 2026–2027, targeting 300,000 recruits this year and another 300,000 next year.

Russia’s political leadership views an additional wave of mobilization as a response to the aggressor state’s loss of the initiative in the war, the continued increase in personnel losses on the front, and the significant slowdown in contract recruitment across the regions. This assessment is based on Ukrainian intelligence data.

Russia’s personnel losses from January through July 2026 amounted to approximately 240,000 people, of whom at least 140,000 were irrecoverable losses. Meanwhile, the number recruited under contract into the Russian occupation contingent during this period was fewer – 232,000.

Ukraine has information that the Russian General Staff has already prepared a scenario for the additional mobilization of 600,000 people within the specified time frames this year and next. First and foremost, they plan to bring up to full strength the formations and military units fighting against Ukrainians, as well as units of the Russian armed forces that are currently being formed.

As part of preparations for the additional wave of mobilization and to allow for the recruitment of criminal elements under contract, Russia has begun making corresponding changes to its legislation and bylaws; control over military registration is being significantly tightened; mechanisms are being created for the additional recruitment of people serving sentences in the Russian prison and penal camp system; and additional coercive measures are being developed.

The categories of convicted persons to be recruited for military service in the occupation contingent have been expanded to include people with unexpunged/unserved convictions under 11 articles of the Russian Criminal Code, including for the smuggling of poisonous, radioactive, and explosive substances, weapons, narcotic substances, and so on; banditry and organizing or participating in a criminal group (gang); organizing illegal migration; violations of safety requirements at fuel and energy facilities; and the illegal handling, theft, or extortion of nuclear materials or radioactive substances, among other offenses under the Criminal Code. The Russian leadership has also approved extending mobilization and/or contract recruitment to certain sizable categories of women serving sentences in prisons and penal camps.

Work is ongoing to determine quotas (assignments) for law enforcement agencies – the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Bailiffs Service, the Federal Penitentiary Service, the Investigative Committee, and others – for sending employees to serve under mobilization.

Depending on their level of training and the projected period of “survivability” of those mobilized by Russia, their training may last 15–60 days. The possibility of some of those mobilized being trained at training grounds in the Republic of Belarus cannot be ruled out.

The Russian leadership is preparing a set of forceful measures to respond to the possible negative social and economic consequences of placing cities and regions under a more stringent wartime regime.

In internal Russian documents, the need for an additional wave of mobilization is justified by a significant increase in dissatisfaction with the war across the regions (with dissatisfaction levels reaching 69%), and, accordingly, a decline in the number of people willing to voluntarily sign contracts.

Problems with contract recruitment are most pronounced in the Oryol and Vladimir regions, as well as in Dagestan. In the Kurgan region, monthly recruitment targets have been met at only 57–69% since the beginning of this year. In the Volgograd region, the number of potential contract recruits has fallen by 40% compared with 2025. A trend toward a further decline in these figures is being recorded in many other Russian regions.

Compared with 2025, in some regions the number of debtors, special contingents among convicted persons and criminal elements, migrants, and other categories that had long been the main recruitment pool for contract service in the Russian army and participation in the war has fallen by 30–40%. The campaign to recruit students has failed, despite the involvement of an overwhelming majority of Russian higher education institutions.

In addition, the Russian leadership plans to increase the personal responsibility of regional authorities and expand the powers of law enforcement agencies.

A system for issuing electronic mobilization orders has already been introduced, and an expansion of coercive measures is being developed: a ban on leaving Russia, taking out loans, buying or selling real estate, revoking driving licenses, blocking funds in bank accounts, and so on. At enterprises, staffing is being expanded in departments responsible for mobilization work and military registration. As of the end of July 2026, more than 2,500 new vacancies had already been posted on electronic employment platforms to staff these mobilization units at enterprises.

Most likely, Russia’s leader will make the decision on mobilization after the “elections” to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, scheduled for 18–20 September this year.